Glenda Satne

Dr. Glenda Satne

Senior Lecturer

Phone: +61 2 4221 3689


Location: 19.2067

About Dr. Satne

I specialize in Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Action. I have done extensive work on normativity and intersubjectivity, working under the supervision of Robert Brandom at the University of Pittsburgh and Dan Zahavi, at the Centre for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. My current project at UOW focuses on the emergence of human specific forms of cognition and advances the hypothesis that social and collective forms of intentionality play a crucial role in the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of those capacities. I develop these ideas within the framework on Radical Enactivism that conceives of representational cognitive capacities as linguistically dependent and coming in late for humans both in development and evolution.

I also work on issues in collective and shared intentionality looking for a good characterization of their different forms to understand the most basic ones and distinguish them from others more abstract or complex. Within this domain of questions, I am currently working – jointly with Johannes Roessler (Warwick)-on what we call the joint practical knowledge thesis, that seeks to characterize the special kind of knowledge that participants in joint intentional action have.

I have published extensively on normativity, intersubjectivity, Wittgenstein, intentionality and shared agency in journals such as Philosophical Topics, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Philosophia, Frontiers in Psychology and wrote various encyclopaedia entries and book chapters on those topics. I have also published a monograph on Rule-Following in Spanish and several articles in Spanish-speaking journals such as Dianoia, Manuscripto, Teorema, amongst others.

Highlighted Publications

  • Satne, G. “Brandom and the Second Person”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2017,
  • Satne, G. “A Two-Step Theory of the Evolution of Human Thinking: Joint and (various) Collective Forms of Intentionality”, Journal of Social Ontology, Book Symposium on Tomasello’s “A Natural History of Human Thinking”, vol. 2, 1, 105-116, 2016.
  • Satne, G. “What binds us together. Normativity and the Second Person”, Philosophical Topics (S.Rödl, J. Conant, eds.), vol. 42, pp. 43-62, 2014.